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The True Function of Law in the International
Community
PHILIP ALLOTT"
My topic is the future of humanity-no less-and the role of law in the
future of humanity. I am especially grateful that, through Mr. Snyder's vision
and generosity, I am able to speak about these matters in the United States of
America. I want to suggest three reasons why it is important to speak about the
future of humanity in the United States, and to speak about it as frankly and as
constructively as possible.
(1) The first reason is that the people of the United States bear a very
heavy responsibility for the future of humanity-an imperial responsibility. It
is the same kind of responsibility that the British exercised, for better and for
worse, in the nineteenth century; that Rome exercised in the last century B.C.
and the first and fourth centuries A.D.; that Greece exercised at the time of
Alexander, in the fourth century B.C. It is a responsibility based on the sheer
facts of American military and economic and cultural power, and the extent of
American economic and political and military investment in the rest of the
world-that is to say, American dependence and vulnerability in relation to the
rest of the world.
(2) The second reason is that an important section of America's ruling
elites believes, at least when they are in their optimistic mode, that the spread
of democracy and capitalism to most countries in the world will produce an
orderly world, by a sort of natural process of self-ordering and self-
improvement, without any special effort of imagination or will.
I call this the Consoling Myth. Or one could call it the Kantian Myth.
Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher of the late eighteenth century,
thought that this is how Europe would sort itself out.' Two World Wars later,
* Fellow of Trinity College and Reader in International Public Law, University of Cambridge. Dr.
Allott was formerly a Legal Counsellor in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He is the author of
EuNoMLA: NEWORDER FOR ANEW WORLD (1990). The present text is a revised version of his Earl Synder
Lecture in International Law delivered at the Indiana University School of Law on September 10, 1997.
1. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose and Perpetual Peace:
A Philosophical Sketch, in KAN"'s POLMCAL WRrriNGS, 41, 93 (H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970). There is a neo-
Kantian school ofacademic International Relations specialists who are seeking to reinforce the faith of the ruling
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having tried, on four occasions, various forms of areopagitic league of nations,
as envisaged by Kant, and having in the meantime also experienced chronic
episodes of genocide, nationalism, and constitutional disorder, we in Europe are
not so benignly optimistic any longer.
The Consoling Myth is not at all consoling. It is a dangerous myth, based
on profound misunderstandings of the nature of democracy and the nature of
capitalism and, incidentally, a misunderstanding of the nature of law. It is also
based on a serious underestimate of the capacity for disorder in the rest of the
human world and a serious underestimate of the cultural complexity of the rest
of the world, a complexity which is, at one and the same time, a source of the
strength-in-diversity of the human species and an obstacle in the way of simple
solutions to problems of global social development.
(3) The third reason for speaking about these matters in the United States
is more complex. The United States is a particularly interesting phenomenon
of world history. It is itself a law-state. It is itself a world-state. The
transformation of the American colonies into a new kind of society at the end
of the eighteenth century was achieved through law. The reconstituting of the
colonies through law was a product of a thousand years of British constitutional
history. One may be permitted occasionally to say that the United States of
America is Britain's Greatest Achievement. (We British have to console
ourselves somehow in our new, more modest circumstances.)
We in Britain had used law to make some sort of integrated society out of
a motley collection of tiresome and aggressive peoples. In British history and
the British psyche, law has played a very similar role to that of law in the
history and psyche of Rome, not only republican Rome, but also imperial
Rome. For the British, as for the Romans, law has been a sort of substitute for
religion. Like the Romans, we used law to make an empire, to hold together a
ragbag of peoples, some with ancient cultures of their own, in some sort of
constitutional package.
The United States was made as a law-state, a Rechtstaat. But, at some
time in the nineteenth century, it began to become a world-state, a Weltstaat.
The United States is a microcosm of the human world, of the actual human
world, and of a potential human world.
Instead of imperializing externally, in the manner of Rome or Britain, the
United States imperialized intemally. With amazing aggressive energy you took
over the rest of southern North America, and then you began to people the vast
2. Rechtstaat and Weltstaat are intended as neologisms, differentiated from Rechtsstaat and Weltstadt.
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new spaces with people brought in from outside-a sort of internal American
empire, composed of people from every part of the world, living together in the
U.S. law-state. One Nation under Law, as Thomas Jefferson would, perhaps,
have preferred to call it.'
In my work, I class the United States as a generic nation, as opposed to a
genetic nation.4 Your collective self-identity is based on common allegiance to
a constitutional system and to a powerful idea of an American way of life,
rather than, as in the case of genetic nations, on ethnic homogeneity or a
collective charismatic vision of a national past. The United States manages to
combine an oppressive social uniformity with a celebration of subcultural
diversity. That is an ingenious achievement which is all your own work.
So it is in a rather more profound way that the United States will have a
determining influence on the future of humanity-not simply through your
mastery of the social forms known as democracy and capitalism, not merely
through your imperial-scale power, and certainly not through your perennially
unsatisfactory long-term diplomacy-but especially through your remarkable
experience as a law-state and a world-state, a cosmopolitan polis, a universal
society-under-law. It is tempting to call this the Manifest Destiny of the United
States, if that expression would not now be politically impolitic. So we might
call it the Historic Destiny of the United States-to inspire and encourage the
true constitutionalizing of all humanity.
These are vast and intensely controversial matters. What I want to do is to
focus in on one portion of this great canvas-the role of law in the making of
the human future: the possibility of a world law-society, the possibility of One
Humanity under Law.
,
To talk about law is to talk about the eighth Wonder of the World. One
would not normally accuse lawyers of excessive modesty. But it is a strange
3. Jefferson regarded the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Virginia (eventually achieved by
legislation in 1786) as one of his greatest achievements. At least as revealed in his published correspondence,
his own religious sensibility was characteristic of an eighteenth-century rationalist, not unlike
Voltaire's-hovering between deism, epicureanism, and unitarianism. His attitude toward law was also
characteristically rationalistic-respecting the Anglo-Saxon origins of the English common law inherited by the
American colonies, acknowledging in a mild Lockeian way some sort of higher natural law, deploring the
tendency to sacralize "the Constitution" (which would be a tyranny of the dead over the living), opposing the
temptation ofthejudicial branch to regard itself as a quasi-sovereign, accepting legislated lawas the expression
of the will of the people, but foreseeing the possibility of a tyranny of the legislature and, eventually, of the
executive.
4. Philip Allott, The Nation as Mind Politic, 24 J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1361 (1992).
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fact that lawyers take so little pride in the sheer wonder of the law. The
extraordinary progress of the human species would not have been possible
without law. We have created a vast law-world in which collective human
effort is organized through law, a world of unlimited possibilities of complexity
and sophistication. An observer looking at our planet from afar would see all
the signs of social activity, from settled agriculture to shopping malls, and, if
the observer had at least the human level of intelligence, would eventually infer
the existence of law, as we infer the existence of law abidingness in the natural
world.
This is the much scorned point that Montesquieu makes in the first
sentences of the Spirit of the Laws (1748), that book which is as peculiar as it
has been influential, including in the United States. His critics have always said
that Montesquieu makes a simple category mistake in confusing different sorts
of law abidingness---natural and human--confusing what the Greeks separated
as physis, nomos, taxis, and dike.' But what the Greeks saw, and Montesquieu
5. See ERNEST BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY: PLATO AND HIS PREDECESSORS, chs. 3, 4 (1918)
(introducing ancient Greek deconstruction of ideas of law); JOHN PLAMENATZ, MAN AND SOCIETY 260-271
(1963) (critiquing Montesquieu's discussion of law, including the notorious first sentence). Montesquieu's six
chapters on law are "the worst in the book." They are "snares and delusions. They lead to nothing." In
discussing Montesquieu's views on the appropriate size of a republic, Hamilton (disagreeing with him in the
matter) refers to him as "that great man." THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). In discussing
Montesquieu's views on the separation of powers, Madison refers to the "celebrated Montesquieu" as "the oracle
who is always consulted and cited on this subject." THE FEDERALISTNO. 47 (James Madison). Although there
was the precedent of Cromwell's Instrument of Government in 1653, not to speak of a long tradition of talk
about "the balance" of the English Constitution, it is surely Montesquieu's famous eleventh chapter which is
most directly reflected in the most important structural features of the Constitution of the United States.
Jefferson seems rather to have been influenced directly by John Locke. Responding to Richard Lee's
assertion that Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence was "copied from Locke's treatise on
Government," Jefferson said, "I know only that I turned to neither book nor pamphlet while writing it. I did
not consider it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas and to offer no sentiment which had ever been
expressed before." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823), in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). In terms reminiscent of Voltaire (at least at one stage of
Voltaire's intellectual development), Jefferson said that he considered Bacon, Locke, and Newton as "the three
greatest men that have ever lived, without exception, and as having laid the foundation of those superstructures
which have been raised in the Physical and Moral Sciences." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull
(Feb. 15, 1789) i THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 939-40 (1984). Jefferson was more reserved in his opinion
of Montesquieu. "I had, with the world, deemed Montesquieu's work of much merit; but saw in it, with every
thinking man, so much of paradox, of false principle and misapplied fact, as to render its value equivocal on
the whole." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRrrINGs,supra note 5, at 1242. Later, Jefferson, after saying in much-quoted words that the Declaration was
designed to "place before mankind the common sense of the subject," he said:
Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any
particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American
mind .... All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether
[Vol. 5:391
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saw, and I agree with him, is that law abidingness is a common condition of all
existence. It is simply that human beings have the interesting characteristic that
we have consciousness, which means that we can be aware of our law
abidingness, and that we can use it purposively for the unlimited further self-
evolution of the human species.
If I were to put the title of this lecture in the form of a question-"What is
the true function of law in the international community?"-then my answer
would be very simple and very controversial.
The true function of law in the international community is precisely the
same as the true function of law in any human society.
This would be controversial in an all too familiar sense. Most people,
including most international lawyers, albeit inpetto, believe that international
law is some special, anomalous sort of law, that it is not "law properly so-
called", as John Austin said in his lectures as the first Professor of
Jurisprudence in the University of London.6 It is law only in some rhetorical or
metaphorical or analogical sense. And the reason people give for this view is
that international society lacks the usual requirements of a legal system,
especially a sovereign to legislate, to execute, to adjudicate.
It is, of course, a European obsession, this search for a legal sovereign. In
the United States you dispensed with a sovereign, not only in the sense of poor
misguided George III, but also in the institutional sense. Of the four kinds of
sovereign known to European systems-a person, the nation, the people, an
institution (say, Parliament)-you chose to have none of them. Internal
sovereignty is not a necessary part of the theoretical explanation of your
constitution, as it is in European, at least in continental European,
constitutions.
But there is another, more interesting, sense in which my assertion about the
true function of international law is controversial. The problem is that no one
has any clear or settled idea about the true nature and function of law in
expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public
right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney &c.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRriNGs, supra note 5,
at 1500-01.
6. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DErERMINED 141-42,200-01 (1832). At the end of
the twentieth century, the philosophically sensitive would find it difficult to use the word "properly" in such a
way, after we have, in the meantime, been subjected to marxism, legal anthropology, pragmatism, logical
positivism, linguistics, semiotics, analytical philosophy, post-modemism, and deconstructionism.
7. See Philip Allott, The Courts and Parliament-Who Whom?, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 79-117 (1979)
(discussing the supposed sovereignty of the British parliament).
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general, least of all lawyers. It is an extraordinary fact that most lawyers leave
laN' school without any clear idea of the nature and function of law. If they
have studied jurisprudence or legal theory, they may leave law school not in
ignorance but in irremediable confusion. It is also an extraordinary fact that
theoretical sociologists can offer hypothetical explanations of society in which
law is not the central feature of the explanation.
For the lawyer, law is what law does. It is the most obvious of social
phenomena, the most unavoidable, the most unquestionable. Who needs an
explanation? This is another Consoling Myth, especially favored by self-
satisfied lawyers in the Anglo-American tradition. The fact is that revolutions
have been made, and much blood spilt, in the name of social theories and,
hence, of legal theories. Law is concerned with the ultimate distribution of
social power, and the justification and enforcement of that distribution. And
when you begin to extrapolate the law-phenomenon from a national context to
the global context, into a situation of great cultural diversity and great social
inequality, it matters a very great deal what explanation of law you have in
mind.
The lawyer who does study legal theory finds that there are certainly many
interesting explanations of the nature and function of law. And that is precisely
the problem. There are far too many such explanations, and they are all
incompatible with each other. Since ancient Greece, not to mention ancient
China or ancient India, there have been countless competing and conflicting
explanations of law.
I want to suggest that, if one tries to make sense of the overwhelming
profusion and confusion of philosophies of law, there are five distinct
explanatory horizons of the law-phenomenon.8
(1) You can explain law as a self-sufficient, self-explaining system. Law
is its own realm of significance. This is known as legal positivism or command
theory or pure theory. A legal system contains its own grounds of validity, its
own rationality. The founding parent is Thomas Hobbes, and the high-priests
have been John Austin and Hans Kelsen.
(2) You can take a realist or pragmatist view, and explain law as a
particular subordinate social system, processing the values of society into
particular forms. Law is a value-processing system. Law is a specific social
8. What is proposed here is afield-theory classification of legal philosophies, related to their respective
fields of theoretical explanation, as opposed to the many substantive classifications, such as those contained in
RoscoE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW ch. 2 (1922).
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system analogous, say, to the economic system of society, or the educational
system. This is very much the average Anglo-American view. The founding-
parent is Aristotle, and the high-priests include Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau,
and Bentham. In academic terms, it takes the form of Legal Realism, of the
American and Scandinavian varieties. And it includes modern American
liberal-democratic theory-Fuller, Rawis, Nozick, and Dworkin.
(3) A third horizon goes still wider in its field of vision and takes in the
whole of the given society. Law and society are coterminous. You cannot
explain law without explaining society as a whole. Law is not just a closed
system of significance, and it is not just a subordinate social system. It is an
integral part of the structure of society, including the economic structure of
society, expressing not only the will of the people but the whole ethos of the
society, the spirit of the society, its past, its Geist. The founding parent of this
approach is Montesquieu, but it is haunted inevitably by the capacious mind of
Aristotle. Its presiding genius is Karl Marx. But it includes also such diversely
interesting people as Edmund Burke, Hegel, the German Historical School, and
Max Weber.
(4) The fourth horizon of law goes beyond the confines of a particular
society, into an order which transcends all societies. Law is the social
actualizing of reason. Law is the natural self-ordering of human beings,
applying reason to reconcile the crude facts of human existence with some ideal
of human flourishing. This is the Natural Law tradition. It was an important
part of the Roman idealizing of law. And it played an important part in the
history of international law. Its founding parents are the Stoics and Cicero,
inspired by the spirits of Plato and Aristotle. Its presiding minds are Aquinas
and Grotius and Wolff and, in his own idiosyncratic way, Hegel.
(5) The fifth horizon goes beyond society to meet up finally with God.
Law is a participation in universal order. In the Western philosophical
tradition, the founding parent of Idealism is Plato. But, for countless religions,
including several of the world-religions, law can only be explained in the
context of an explanation of all existence, and the orderliness of all existence.
A first effect of separating out the possible horizons of explanation of legal
philosophy is, indeed, in relation to the problem of the nature and function of
international law. It reminds us that the nature and function of law itself is so
much a subject of controversy that there can be no simple answer to the
question: is international law law?
1998] 397
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A second effect is what we may call the Russell-Wittgenstein effect. We
can begin to see that the notorious confusions and endless debates among legal
philosophers could be regarded as based on category mistakes or a confusion
between distinct realms of discourse. You cannot expect a Natural lawyer to
have much to say to a Realist or a Positivist, and vice versa. You cannot expect
a Marxist, who challenges society's hegemony over thought processes including
value-forming processes, to have much to say to an American Liberal
Pragmatist, who is content to interpret and reinterpret a given society's values.
Wittgenstein said that his aim in philosophy was "to show the fly the way out
of the fly-bottle."9 The challenge is to help philosophers to stop running around
each other in small circles of incomprehension and contempt by showing that
they are talking at different levels of explanation in different realms of
discourse.
But it is a third effect of the five-horizon approach to legal philosophy
which is, for me, the most significant. My own work is designed to demonstrate
the rather extreme proposition that the wonder of law is precisely that law is an
integrating ofallfive levels. The wonder of law is that it links everyday human
behavior to the order of the universe through the self-ordering of society.
Law is a closed system of rationality, a thought-world unto itself. Law is
a systematic actualizing of a given society's values. Law is an expression of the
totality of a society's existence. The law of a given society is in dialectical
tension with ideas which transcend the given society, ideas of morality and
justice and rationality. And law is inevitably connected with our ideas about the
ultimate things--our ultimate ideas about the natural world, and our ultimate
ideas about humanity's relationship to the supernatural and the spiritual.
This is the wonder of the law-phenomenon. Law achieves this wonderful
feat of dialectical integration in an amazingly efficient way, day after day, year
in, year out, like some marvelously engineered machine. And, needless to say,
a main theme of mine today is to say that it is our job to make sure that,
hereafter, international law becomes able to do all these things for all humanity,
for the society of all societies.
But first we have to try to answer the question: how does law achieve all
this? What is the secret of its amazing society-making capacity? To answer
9. LUDWIG Wr-rGENSTEIN, PHI1OSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 103 (G. Anscombe trans., 1974).
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." Id. at 47. See also
BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH ch. 4 (1940) (discussing the "hierarchy of
language" and "theory of types" centered on the idea that grounds of truth at one level of discourse are
inapplicable at another).
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this question we have to move the focus in one step closer and say how law
works. It is another extraordinary fact that law students leave law school with
very little idea of how law works. They have learned the procedures, the tricks
of the trade, some legal principles, perhaps, the names of famous cases, where
to look to find the law. But, normally, they have not even the most rudimentary
idea of how law works, mechanically, so to speak, of what is under the hood of
the legal motor car.
What law does is to allow a society to choose its future. Law is made in the
past, to be applied in the present, in order to make society take a particular form
in the future. Law carries a society's idea of its own future from the past into
the future. Law carries society's structures and systems from the past into the
future. Law makes possible society's possible futures.
For example, a law on environmental management. Such a law conditions
the behavior of those who may be planning a new industrial project. It
conditions the behavior of those who want to react to that proposal. It
conditions the behavior of those who have power to permit, prohibit, or modify
the proposal. When the environmental management law is applied in a
particular situation, the outcome is produced by an intersecting ofthe behavior
of all the relevant people in such a way that the net outcome is within the range
of possibilities which have been defined by the law as serving the common
interest of society as a whole.
That is the way law works. It enacts in a particular form the common
interest of society as a whole. It then disaggregates that common interest by
relating it to the actual detailed behavior of particular society members. And
the result is that, in taking their individual self-interested decisions, individual
society members, if they act in conformity with the law, also and inevitably
serve the common interest of society.
You are free to make your own life-choices, from moment to moment. But,
to the extent that you do so in conformity with the law, you are also serving the
common interest of society. Private interest is then also public good. Private
well-being and public well-being are reconciled through law. We make our own
future by making our everyday life-choices. But society has chosen a range of
its possible futures, and that range of possible futures is embodied in the law.
So, in conforming to the law, we are society's agents in making a future for
1998]
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society which is within the range of possibilities which society has chosen. This
is law's thaumaturgy.'0
It is precisely this blueprint of the law-machine which must come to be our
blueprint of the international-law-machine--incorporating the common interest
of all humanity in legal form, then disaggregating that common interest through
the law-conforming behavior of all human beings and all subordinate human
societies, so that the private interest of each human being and each human
society is reconciled with the common interest of all humanity.
But before we extrapolate all this to the global level, we must close in the
focus of our jurisprudential microscope two further steps. How does law do
these things? How does it insert the common interest of society into the private
interest of society members, into our everyday behavior? How does law work
its wonder, as a matter of sheer social mechanics? This brings us down to the
molecular level of law. We must do some molecular jurisprudence.
Most lawyers are led to believe that the law works by creating legal rules,
through legislation or through decided cases. Most lawyers think that a legal
system is a set of legal rules. This is an awful error. Law is not a set of legal
rules. Law is a system of legal relations. Law does not say: thou shalt not
murder, thou shalt carry out thy contractual promises, thou shalt not park in a
no-parking area. Law fixes a legal relationship between two or more persons
in relation to a given situation.
We owe a great debt to Wesley Hohfeld, the American legal theorist, for
his work on the topic of legal relations. 1 Of course, it had long been
seen-by Hobbes, Bentham, and Salmond among others, and by a number
of German legal theorists-that, at the deep-structural level, law is made up
of rights and duties.12 But Hohfeld suggested a simple framework of
analysis of legal relations, including a particularly enlightening analysis of
the difficult word right. He suggested that, in fact, the law makes use of
10. Bernard de Mandeville's seemingly paradoxical thesis, Private Vices, Public Benefits, demonstrated
allegorically in his A Fable of the Bees, proved to be prophetic of the dynamic development of eighteenth
century social and economic philosophy, which found that it was possible to reconcile, theoretically and even
practically, self-interest and public interest. The highly productive society of vicious bees fell apart when Jove
suddenly made the bees virtuous. Or, as the prophet of modem capitalist society asserted, "I have never known
much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
292 (K. Sutherland ed., 1993) (1776).
1I. His writings on the matter were published posthumously. WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (W.W. Cook ed., 1923).
12. See R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE Ch. 2 (5th ed., 1985) (discussing a synoptic view of legal-relations
analysis).
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four different kinds of rights. This is a wonderfully illuminating idea, which
can help to solve countless everyday legal confusions. Others have taken the
analysis further. And it has been criticized and defended. But the
underlying idea is still wonderfully illuminating, and all law students, not to
mention all judges, should be compelled to master it.
The amazing fact is that the whole vast edifice of the law depends on a
tiny handful of possible legal relations. All legislation, all law , is an endless
permutation of rights, powers, freedoms, duties, liabilities, immunities, and
so on. There is nothing else.
The parties to a contract, neighboring property owners, a married
couple, a government department, an industrial corporation, Congress, the
Supreme Court; all are tied into each other by a vast, infinite web of legal
relations, designed to condition actual interactive human behavior. We may
conform to the law without intending to do so. We may choose to break the
law. But every moment of our lives, every thing that we do and say is
always and everywhere subject to the infinite interlocking network of
potential legal relations. So how does a legal relation work? We must now
examine the atomic and sub-atomic levels of law.
A legal relation is made up of abstract patterns-citizen, voter, company,
nuisance, act of Congress, contract, collision, interpersonal violence.
13
Legal relations are patterns of potentiality into which actual persons and
things and events and places can be fitted. The law creates a sort of parallel
universe, alongside everyday human reality and the reality of the natural
world, a virtual law-reality in which persons and things and events and
places have a particular and special law-significance. 4 A particular legal
13. See Philip Allott, The International Court and the Voice of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUROF SIR ROBERTJENN1NGS 17,19-39 (Vaughan Lowe&
Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) (analyzing a legal relation as matrix, heuristic, and algorithm).
14. Throughout his lifetime Jeremy Bentham struggled, in a way which foreshadowed the travails of
twentieth-century linguistic philosophy, with the problem of the fictional character of law. At Oxford
University, he had reacted strongly against what he considered to be the archaism and obscurantism of William
Blackstone's view of English law, including Blackstone's defense of legal fictions. In his youthful Fragment
on Government (1776), Bentham spoke of"the pestilential breath ofFiction." However, he subsequently came
to see that law is a system of language, and that it necessarily uses language to create pseudo entities (such as
property, contract, rights, etc.). Yet the fictive use of language had also been the means by which despots and
deceivers of all kinds, including priests and judges, had taken power over people's minds. He returned to this
vexing problem in many of his writings. See CHARLES KAY OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICIONS (1932)
(relating Bentham's work to a later philosophy). Bentham believed that legal relations (right, duty, etc.) would
rightly be included in what he called "the metaphysics ofjurisprudence," and should hence form part of what
he envisaged as a possible "universal jurisprudence" (relating to law of all places and times). JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTIONTOTHE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 325 (1948). See JAMES STEINTRAGER,
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relation-in fact, a vast web of legal relations-becomes applicable, is
switched on, when a particular person, thing, event, or place matches the
pattern of the legal relation.
When we get into a car, order a meal, register as a voter, set up a
corporation, or whatever, we log into a sort of sub-program of the vast
seamless computer program known as law. And our behavior in relation to
each other-the behavior of the parties to the legal relation-is law-
conforming behavior if it matches the pattern of the legal relation; if we
obey the rules of the road, if we pay our bill when called on to do so,
register our vote in the correct way, do business as a corporation in
accordance with corporation law.
This picture of society-under-law is thus a model of society as a three-
tiered structure, a sandwich, with law in the center. Below the law is actual
human life and behavior, the infrastructure of law. Above the law is the rest
of the social process, the superstructure of law-religion, education,
philosophy, society's ideas and ideals, the public realm in general, and what
I call the public mind-social consciousness. Above all, the superstructure
contains politics. Politics is the struggle to determine the common interest
of society and the struggle to dominate society's public realm, especially its
lawmaking and law-executing systems. Through politics we struggle about
who shall dominate the lawmaking process, about what the content of the
law shall be, about how law shall be implemented.
Returning to the analogy with a motor car, we may recall that a motor
car requires three things to make it move-gas, oil, and air to fire the
engine; the system of the car itself, including its engine; and the driver to
switch on the engine and to direct its line of travel. Infrastructure, structure,
and superstructure. Or, to return to the five horizons of legal philosophy,
we can now identify the way in which law may be seen as being, indeed, a
very special form of social system, but a system that is inextricably
embedded in all the rest of social and transcendental reality, in all the
structures and systems of ideas which make social life possible.
To explain completely how a motor car works you cannot stop at the
three necessary elements mentioned above. You would have to go much
further and incorporate the whole explanation of the natural world-gravity,
thermodynamics, the chemistry of oil, quantum mechanics even. And you
would have to offer an explanation of the human world-how and why
BENTHAM (1977) (discussing Bentham's unpublished writings).
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human beings have harnessed particular aspects of the natural world in a
particular way. To explain a motor car fully and to explain law fully you
must in the end include a transcendental explanation of the universe as a
whole.
In this way, we are enabled to see that democracy is a wonderfully
efficient version of the three-stage social machine (infrastructure, structure,
superstructure), in which the three stages mesh together with exceptional
efficiency, with a very lively superstructural public mind producing vast
amounts of structural law to condition infinitely complex human social
behavior which in turn flows into the dynamic of the superstructural life of
society. 5
And we may also see that capitalism is a very closely analogous system,
efficiently intermeshing the three levels around the central structure of
law-linking the wealth of the individual with the wealth of the nation,
reconciling private interest and public interest, through the mediating system
of law, but also involving transcendental ideas about property, the good life,
human happiness, and so on. It is law, and 6nly law, which makes possible,
even in so-called free-market capitalism, the infinitely dense and infinitely
dynamic reconciling of private and public interest.
Law moves from the particular to the general to the universal, and back
again, in a ceaseless reciprocating motion. Law is the dynamic principle of
society-change in stability, stability in change. You step twice into the
same river of law, but not into the same water. 6
It took thousands of years of hard experience and hard thinking for
humanity to reach this stage of self-directed social development.
What happens when we try to extrapolate such an idea of society-under-
law to the global level, to imagine all humanity as a society-under-law, the
society of all societies? There are very many obvious ways in which our
ideas of international society differ profoundly from the society-under-law
model that I have sketched so far.
15. The three structural elements postulated here are representations at the level of practical theory of the
pure-theory conceptions (real constitution, legal constitution, ideal constitution) proposed in PHILIP ALLOTr,
EuNOMIA: NEwORDERFORANE w WORLD ch. 9 (1990). See also id. 12.49 (distinguishing between pure and
practical theory).
16. The dialectical character of law reflects the ultimately dialectical character of all society, which, as
a matter of pure theory, may be analyzed as a set of five dialectically interacting "perennial dilemmas", each
of which is itself a dialectic of change. See ALLOrr, supra note 15, at chs. 4-6.
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(1) The substructure of human behavior in the case of international law
seems to be, not the behavior of human beings, but the behavior of so-called
governments acting on behalf of so-called states, some 190 states. The
international system, as it is sometimes optimistically called, is regarded as
consisting of the more or less systematic interaction of the national public
realms. All the other aspects of the national social systems are only
involved indirectly and virtually and marginally and haphazardly.
(2) The network of legal relations under international law does not apply
to vast areas of extra-national, non-statal human activity, in particular, vast
quantities of economic transactions conducted by industrial, commercial, and
financial corporations, whose behavior is covered by legal relations arising
under 190 conflicting, overlapping, and uncoordinated legal systems. This
means that international capitalism, although it profoundly affects the lives
of all people everywhere, is not itself the product of, or subject to, any
universal social or legal system but is some sort of aggregate product of
national capitalist social and legal systems.
(3) International law is regarded as arising, not as the product of an
international social superstructure, but from the substructural behavior of
governments-in the form of so-called treaties and customary international
law. The theory of customary international law is that the law-conforming
behavior of states itself generates the law. International law is conceived of
as horizontal law, in which the subjects of the law are also the makers of the
law.
(4) There seems to be no concept of the common interest of all
humanity, only the intersecting and random aggregating of the conflicting
interests of the states, as defined by their governments, conducting what is
called "foreign" policy through a process known as "diplomacy." This
means that, although diplomacy and its failures can profoundly, even
terminally, affect the lives of millions of people all over the world, it is not
integrated into any worldwide social process, including any normal
democratic process.
(5) There seems to be no global superstructure, with a general social
process-a global public realm, a public mind of all humanity, a social
conglomerate of ideas and ideals. And this means that there seems to be no
such thing as international politics, a struggle to determine the common
interest of all humanity, a struggle to choose possible human futures with a
view to their actualizing through law.
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(6) There seems to be no concept of the social unity of all humanity.
Things that happen outside the territory of a given state, or inside the
territory of another state, are regarded as foreign or alien; only of interest
and concern when they affect or threaten life within the state above some
arbitrarily determined level of tolerance, or when they offer some
opportunity for material advantage. Below the threshold of the intolerable
and when they offer no possible material advantage, foreign things might as
well be happening on another planet.
This means that the age-old philosophical debates about the nature and
purpose of social life, and the nature and purpose of law, are not regarded
as applicable to the condition and the potentiality of humanity as a whole.
Social and legal philosophy, whether framed along positivist, liberal,
socialist, idealist, or transcendental lines, mysteriously come to a halt at
national frontiers.
The anomalous social situation of all humanity, illustrated in the six
items listed above, should fill us with the shock of the familiar. We should
recognize the characteristics of an underdeveloped society and we should
rightly draw upon a specific historical analogy. International society in its
current state is peculiarly reminiscent of European societies in our tribal
period, from the end of the Roman Empire in the fifth century to the
beginning of modern society in the twelfth century. We live an
anachronism, the synchronic existence of diachronic social forms. We live
in post-1789 societies which are participants in a medieval unsociety.
We in the United States and Britain have privileged mental access to
European society of the tribal period. Anglo-American legal culture
contains within it, to this day, two elements which derive from the legal
culture of the Nordic-Germanic tribes which swept through Europe in that
period and which, as they settled, came to form the successor kingdoms of
the Roman Empire, including England and France.
(1) In the Nordic-Germanic societies of tribal Europe, law had as its
primary function conflict resolution. Such procedures as trial by ordeal, by
fire, by compurgation, and by champions were designed to find a winner and
overawe a loser. It is this ethos which survives to this day in the adversarial
nature of Anglo-American legal culture.
(2) In the Nordic-Germanic legal culture, law was not seen as something
which was handed down from above. The judge was an umpire or a
ringmaster rather than the voice of justice. The king was a tribal chieftain,
the umpire of umpires, the fittest who happened to survive. He was himself,
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in some sense, under the law. Law arose from experience, custom, regular
behavior.
The horizontal aspects of lawmaking in both the common law and
international law, the centrality of litigation in the common law and the
obsession with so-called dispute resolution in international law, such things
show the survival of tribalism into a social world which has otherwise long
since surpassed tribalism.
In the twelfth century, continental Europe embarked on a different
course, gradually returning to a different model of law. Roman law and its
ethos were allowed to flow once again into the tribalistic law systems of the
post-Roman societies. Roman law had been a great, perhaps the greatest,
achievement of Roman culture, a tradition in which law is something more
than a system of conflict resolution, in which law has its ultimate source
somewhere above and beyond its subjects and its practitioners, a tradition in
which the judge is the voice and agent of the law, lex loquens.
For several centuries it seemed as if the Roman ethos would determine
also the character of international law, that international law would be an
ingenious combining, a double helix of two further particular and
sophisticated strands within the complex web of Roman law-the idea of a
law of the nations which transcends the laws of the nations, and the idea of
a law which reflects the inherent unity of human beings as rational beings
(Natural Law). Sometime in the eighteenth century, such a Roman model
of international law was finally displaced by another model which reflected
a new ethos, and which was a by-product of other complex developments of
systems and ideas within national societies, especially the societies of Britain
and the United States, but a new ethos which would be fatally corrupted in
its passage from national society into the international unsociety.
From the fourteenth century onwards the rapid development in the
complexity of British society necessitated the introduction of vertical law,
in the form of parliamentary legislation, drawing, once again, on a Nordic-
Germanic tradition, this time that of conciliar kingship, the idea that the king
acted with the advice of his leading counselors.
What we now speak of as liberal democracy is a reconciliation of
horizontal and vertical lawmaking, the exceptionally efficient system
17. See SUSAN REYNOLDS, KINGDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 900-1300 (1984)
(recounting the intricate story of the medieval interaction of elements of Roman law and customary law
systems).
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considered above for resolving conflicting particular interests within the
common interest of society. It is interesting to think how different world
history might have been if England had not preserved the anachronistic spirit
of tribal customary law.
Government of the people by the people, that brilliant phrase used by
Abraham Lincoln, expresses the wonderful paradox of democracy and its
daring self-mythologizing. In a democracy we the people believe that we are
both the makers and the subjects of law. That idea might not have
developed had it not been for the historical chance that England had to find
a means of squaring the circle of, on the one hand, a requirement for more
and more legislated law, and, on the other hand, a robust visceral rejection
of the absolutist ambitions of monarchs and their co-conspirators.
Constitutional monarchy, and its successor liberal democracy, are an
ingenious and hazardous dialectic of absolutism and anarchy.
It was the spirit of anti-absolutism (in the case of Britain and the United
States) and of post-absolutism (in the case of continental Europe), rather than
the spirit of liberal democracy, which determined that form of international
law which is the law of the existing international unsociety. The post-1789
international unsociety contains the national societies on a footing of fictional
equality (the sovereign equality of states), whatever the condition of their
internal constitutional development (the nature of their state, in the internal
sense). And it treats the controllers of the national public realms
(governments) as if they were absolute monarchs, wholly embodying their
national societies (les 6tats, c'est nous), but still monarchs under the law (a
horizontal consensual international law). Government of the states by the
governments of the states!
,
And so we return to the Historic Destiny of the United States-to inspire
and encourage the true constitutionalizing of all humanity, of One Humanity
Under Law. And the historic destiny of the United States is also the
Historic Responsibility of Europe, that Europe which has had so profound
an effect, in thought and in deed, for better and for worse, on the destiny of
all humanity.
History shows that social progress has very often been the product of
imitation and emulation. At each historical period there has been what we
may call a paragon culture, certain attributes of one particular society which
act as an explicit or implicit model for the development of other societies.
Ancient Greece was a paragon culture for republican Rome. Monastic
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culture was a paragon in the darkest days of the Middle Ages. Norman
culture was a paragon culture for medieval England. Arab-Jewish high
culture was a paragon in the revival of European culture in the twelfth
century. French high culture was a paragon for all of Europe from the
twelfth century until 1789. Italian Renaissance high culture was a paragon
for Renaissance Europe as a whole. The sociopolitical and scientific culture
of seventeenth-century England was a paragon culture for Enlightenment
Europe in the eighteenth century. The new America was a paragon political
culture for revolutionary France. The new economic system of industrial-
revolution Britain was a paragon culture for continental Europe and then for
the United States in the nineteenth century. German academic and
administrative culture was a paragon for all Europe in the nineteenth
century. The imperial powers were paragon cultures for many societies all
over the world in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
Since 1945 the United States has been the paragon culture for the rest of
the world. Not all these dominating cultural phenomena have been wholly
admirable-not even the post-1945 United States. To speak of paragon
cultures is to speak of historical realities rather than to make moral or
aesthetic judgments.
Post-1945 United States culture is the culture of impatience and
impermanence, the epitome of the frenzy of relentless change which has
possessed the Western mind since 1789. It is the culture of pleonexia, of too
much and too fast. The treadmill of capitalism and the carousel of
democracy never stop. All over the world, cultures which had hardly
changed in centuries or even millennia have been swept up into the post-
1789 fast-life culture. And yet the United States itself, Weltstaat of unity-in-
diversity and diversity-in-unity, is also a country of stability-in-change. Its
constitutional institutions are still those of the eighteenth century. Despite
its massive urbanization, it seems to retain a balance-point of rural and small
town dignity, of interpersonal respect, personal aspiration, and moderate
idealism, all coexisting with the spirit of the nineteenth-century frontier, a
frontier of unlimited possibilities and invincible pragmatism. American
culture as a paragon culture for the world is an ambiguous phenomenon.
Frenetic social change is not a new phenomenon. Transcultural social
change is not a new phenomenon. And there are precedents for the
intelligent management of deep structural social change. In the nineteenth
century most European societies experienced fundamental structural change.
The fact of the American Revolution and the ideas of the French Revolution
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combined with the potentialities of the industrial revolution to make possible
a huge development of social complexity and sophistication. And what may
be called the Prussian Revolution made possible the increasingly rational
management of the public realm of these amazingly complex and dynamic
societies.
Can we now see on the horizon fundamental structural change at the
level of international society, the society of all societies? What can we do
to make a future international society measure up to the standards and the
values and the ideals that we take for granted in our national societies?
How can we make available for the development of international society the
best of the long millennia of thought and experience of society-under-law?
How can we take international society from its primitive tribal condition into
an advanced social condition?
The essence of all that has been said above is that law will not perform
its true function internationally until we have a conception of an international
society of the whole human race, an international social system capable of
processing conflicting interests and conflicting ideas about the future of the
human world-right-wing ideas, left-wing ideas, liberal ideas, conservative
ideas, rationalistic ideas, religious ideas, passionate ideas. And it must be
an international system capable of forming ideas about the common interest
of all humanity and of each human being, and capable of disaggregating that
common interest through legal relations, which condition the behavior of all
human beings everywhere.
To many Americans the idea of an emerging international social system
would seem like a nightmare, a premonition of universal socialism. For
many Americans, the very idea of the United Nations is already
objectionable. In early nineteenth-century Europe, the development of
popular democracy and the rise of an aggressive urban middle-class seemed
like a nightmare to the old privileged classes. In certain countries in
Europe, the old privileged class stayed on, intransigent and incorrigible,
learning nothing, forgetting nothing. In due course, those countries paid a
terrible price for their misjudgment of history. And, in this century, we all
had to pay some part of that terrible price.
During Britain's prolonged social revolt (1815-48), which was virtually
a revolution, even the Duke of Wellington, fervent defender of the old social
order, eventually saw that the only way to preserve the best of the past was
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to come to terms with the forces of the future."8 Today, the United States
is the Duke of Wellington. The old-order U.S. hegemony of the period
1945-1989 cannot survive unmodified in a new world order of overwhelming
complexity and instability. It would be good to be able to say that, in the
new global social drama, Europe is playing the role of Sir Robert Peel, an
astute manager of Britain's managed revolution.'9 But the European public
mind is in a sorry state at the present time-demoralized and confused in the
face of a process often referred to anxiously in Europe as "globalization",
a process which seems to be beyond Europe's practical and theoretical
control. A profound lesson of the turbulent period of 1815-48, in Europe
as a whole, is the part played in social change by writers, artists, and
intellectuals in general. Liberated by the mental revolutions of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the public mind of Europe overflowed
with a torrent of new thinking. The new order in nineteenth-century Europe
was as much a product of the pen as of the marketplace, the statute book, or
the street demonstration. To mention only a handful of representative
British names-it was a new order imagined by Adam Smith, prophet of
unlimited economic progress; by William Godwin, prophet of unlimited free-
thinking and of human self-perfecting through education; by Jeremy
18. Wellington had been, together with Horatio Nelson, Napoleon's nemesis. Military tactician rather than
subtle politician, he could recognize a position that was not worth defending. Epitome of the Protestant,
aristocratic, land-owning oligarchy who had managed to retain their privileges after the so-called Glorious
Revolution of 1688 and during the development of Cabinet government in the eighteenth century, he "gave
way", as a charismatic leader in the House of Lords, on three dramatic occasions, to the dismay of his more
extreme Tory allies: the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 (removing some ofthe legal disabilities on Roman
Catholics); the Reform Act of 1832 (extending somewhat the franchise ofthe House of Commons and reforming
the electoral process); and the Corn Importation Act of 1846 (repealing the Corn Laws, a system of trade-
protection whose principles and mechanisms were remarkably similar to those of the Common Agricultural
Policy of the European Community, and which had favored agricultural interests and inflated the price ofbasic
foodstuffs).
19. Sir Robert Peel, Prime Minister from 1841-46, is regarded asthe founder of the (British) Conservative
Party (superseding the old-regime Tories). Peel was of middle-class origin, at least in the sense that his father,
the first baronet, had been a successful businessman. In a letter addressed in 1834 to the electors of his
constituency (since known as the Tamworth Manifesto), he appealed to "that great and intelligent class of
society... which is much less interested in the contentions of party, than in the maintenance of order and the
cause of good government." He had opposed the parliamentary reform of 1832 but now accepted that it was
"a final and irrevocable settlement of a great Constitutional question" and spoke of what he took to be "the
spirit" of the new constitutional order, involving "a careful review of institutions... undertaken in a friendly
temper" and the "correction of proved abuses and the redress of real grievances." ROBERT PEEL, MEMOIRS BY
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR ROBERT PEEL 58 (1858). In Parliament in 1833 he had said that he was "for
reforming every institution that really requires reform; but he was for doing it gradually, dispassionately, and
deliberately .. " Id. at 69.
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Bentham, prophet of rational social change through legislation;" by S.T.
Coleridge, prophet of the idealist reconciliation of reason, faith, and art; by
J.S. Mill, prophet of the strengths and weaknesses of mass democracy; by
Robert Owen, prophet of the redeeming of the slavery of capitalist society
through pragmatic idealism.
In that period of profound and self-conscious human self-reconceiving
and self-reconstituting, the rich products of the mind articulated the
possibilities and structured the choices in making a different kind of human
future. We are going to have to be very clever, more clever even than our
clever predecessors in the nineteenth century, if we are going to redeem the
current situation, a global situation which is much more complex and
challenging than were the national revolutionary transformations of the
nineteenth century.
The first step is to try to detect and to measure the deep currents of
change already present in the international situation, the first signs of an
emerging new human world, a new human self-conceiving and self-
constituting. For those who are able to remain calm in the face of such
disruptive social change, such things are (to abuse a Shakespearean image)
the darling buds of May, still vulnerable to very rough winds from every
point of the compass.
(1) International Community. The use of this expression by politicians,
diplomats, journalists, and academic specialists is tending to establish within
general consciousness a fictitious conceptual entity with effects and
characteristics which surpass the practical purposes of those who make use
of it. Among the implications arising by-the-way, as it were, are the ideas
of universal judge (Weltgericht),2 of universal standard setter, and of
universal accountability (for the actions of governments and their agents).
(2) International security. Despite the hallowed origins of the
expression (League of Nations Covenant; U.N. Charter), use of the
expression has intensified since 1989 as an intrinsically binary or defense
conception of international public order (epitomized in the Cold War balance
20. In perhaps the most readable of his writings, Bentham poured scorn, one by one, on dozens of
fallacious arguments which are habitually used to resist rational social change, all of which continue, to this day
and despite his eloquence, to be used for that purpose. See JEREMY BENTHAM, HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
FALLACIES (H. Larrabee ed., 1952).
21. Hegel borrowed from Schiller the saying, "the history of the world... is the world's court of
judgment." G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILosOPHYOFRIGHT216 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942). For Hegel, out of the history
of the infinitely contingent behavior of nations there arises a"world mind" which sits in judgment objectively,
abstractly, and ideally. Id. at 36.
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of power) has been giving way to an idea of the interdependence of social
order everywhere.
(3) Ecology. The idea of the interdependence of every aspect of the
human physical habitat is now in dialectical tension with the institutionalized
self-interest of "states" and industrial and commercial corporations.
(4) Global economy. The idea of the interconnectedness of all economic
activity everywhere is generating the corollary idea that the maximizing of
the wealth of any particular national society may depend on the quality of the
governmental, administrative, and legal systems of many or all other
national societies.
(5) Universal values. The possibility of truly universal human values is
itself a highly controverted matter, given the intense cultural diversity of the
human world, but there is a real sense in which universal values are in the
process of formation whenever cross-cultural value judgments (ethical, legal,
religious, political, pragmatic, aesthetic) are made, especially when they are
expressed, as more and more frequently they are, in an articulated and
permanent form (treaty, judicial decision, resolution, declaration).
(6) International legislation. The volume of international prescriptive
texts is now very great, very often giving rise to social systems for their
implementation, interpretation, and enforcement. Such prescriptions more
and more frequently relate to behavior and events within the social systems
of the "states."
(7) Public responsibility. The extension of the principles and even the
procedures of criminal law to the behavior of governments and their agents,
including the personal responsibility of those agents, has introduced into
international society ideas of enforceable accountability which surpass
traditional international law concepts of state responsibility and which are
reminiscent of the development of "rule of law" conceptions in national
social systems.
(8) Non-governmental organizations. The allegiance of such bodies is
to no government. They may represent particular non-governmental
interests, but they may also seek to represent the common interest of all
human beings. In such cases, they are in permanent dialectical tension with
representatives of more particular interests.
(9) Differentiated patterns of consciousness. Regionalism, pluralism,
transnational ethnic and religious consciousness, involve patterns of
consciousness which do not. fit established patterns of national
consciousness.
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(10) Global consciousness. A form of universal consciousness--of
science and engineering, of the universities, of high culture and popular
culture, of the global computer network, of the mass media-is becoming a
powerful counter-consciousness to all forms of local and sectional
consciousness.
For those of us who devote our lives to thinking about these things, the
great task of the coming decades is to imagine a new kind of international
social system, to imagine a new role for the United Nations in the new kind
of world which is forming so rapidly, and to imagine at last a new kind of
post-tribal international law, which extends to the level of all humanity the
wonder-working capacity of law, when law is properly understood.
For those who would preserve the best of the human world as it is, the
best form of defense is law-law in our local neighborhood, law across the
whole world. For those who suffer, in body or in spirit, from the
imperfection of the human world as it is, the best way to make a better
world is the way of law.
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